The European Union’s common foreign and security policy after lisbon by Koutrakos, P.
Koutrakos, P. (2012). The European Union’s common foreign and security policy after lisbon. In: D. 
Ashiagabor, N. Countouris & I. Lianos (Eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon. (pp. 
185-209). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107017573 
City Research Online
Original citation: Koutrakos, P. (2012). The European Union’s common foreign and security policy 
after lisbon. In: D. Ashiagabor, N. Countouris & I. Lianos (Eds.), The European Union after the 
Treaty of Lisbon. (pp. 185-209). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107017573 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8662/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
The European Union's Common Foreign and Security 





The European Union has been going through a long group therapy process since the 
end of 2001. This culminated in a treaty which died a long and slow death following 
two referenda (the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe), another treaty (the 
Lisbon Treaty), and two further referenda in Ireland before the new constitutional 
arrangements entered into force in December 2009.  
 
Throughout these eight years of self-reflection, the foreign affairs of the Union were 
at the centre of interest and debates. This was made clear in the Laeken Declaration, 
which kickstarted the process in 2001, and raised this question: ‘[d]oes Europe not, 
now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a 
stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and 
peoples?’1 Once the Constitutional Treaty was signed, the then President of the 
Commission, Romano Prodi, stated that ‘today, Europe is reaffirming the unique 
nature of its political organization in order to respond to the challenges of 
globalisation, and to promote its values and play its rightful role on the international 
scene’.2  
                                                 
   *Professor of European Union Law and Jean Monnet Chair in European Law, University of Bristol; 
Professor of Law, University of Antwerp. 
1
 European Council, December 14-15, 2001, p. 2. 
2
 Speech delivered in Rome at the ceremony on the signing of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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This emphasis on the EU’s international role also informed the Lisbon Treaty. 
Launching the Intergovernmental Conference which led to its drafting and  adoption, 
the European Council stated that, ‘[i]n order to secure our future as an active player in 
a rapidly changing world and in the face of ever-growing challenges, we have to 
maintain and develop the European Union’s capacity to act…’.3  
 
This focus aimed to address a number of concerns about how the Union acted in the 
world. Two of these were about the complexity of the legal arrangements governing 
the Union's foreign affairs, and the ensuing coherence of the relevant policies. In 
relation to the former, the pillar structure, established at Maastricht and maintained 
by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, and the dichotomy between the European 
Community which carried out external economic relations, and the Union, 
responsible for external political relations, were seen as increasingly difficult to 
defend in the light of the multiplicity of actors and roles which they entailed. As for 
the latter, Timothy Garton-Ash makes the following observation: ‘Europe has a 
hundred left hands and none of them knows what the right hand is doing. Trade, 
development, aid, immigration policy, education, cultural exchange, classic 
diplomacy, arms sales and anti-proliferation measures, counter-terrorism, the fight 
against drug and organized crime: each European policy has an impact, but the 
effects are fragmented and often self-contradictory’.4 
 
In other words, the Union' foreign affairs were viewed to be carried out on the basis of 
complex and obscure legal rules, involving a range of institutions which interacted 
                                                 
3
 European Council Conclusions (21-2 June 2007), para. 2.  
4
 T. Garton-Ash, Free World (London: Penguin, 2005) 218. 
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with very little coordination, and in a way which deprived the Union of both clarity as 
to its policies, and clout as to its presence. Indeed, the Mandate of the 2007 
Intergovernmental Conference which led to the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty 
mentioned coherence as an imperative for the EU's foreign affairs in its very first 
paragraph.5 In addition to these concerns, the new Treaty aimed to meet the ambitions 
which the Union had been articulating in the last ten years. The European Security 
Strategy, for instance, states that ‘Europe should be ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.6 
 
The Union's institutions have been tireless in their praise for the significance of the 
new provisions. Acording to the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty ‘will bring 
increased efficiency to our external action’.7 In its Opinion on the 2007 
Intergovernmental Conference, the European Commission stated that the latter ‘will 
give Europe a clear voice in relations with our partners worldwide, and sharpen the 
impact and visibility of our message … This will mean an EU able to play a more 
responsive and effective part in global affairs’.8 And President Sarkozy of France 
wrote during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August 2008 that, had the new Treaty 
entered into force, the Union would have had the institutions it needed in order to 
cope better with international crisis.9 
 
                                                 
5
 See IGC 2007 Mandate, Council SG/11218/07, POLGEN74, para.1. 
6
 A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12 December 2003), 1. 
See also the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a 
Changing World (Brussels, 11 December 2008), and the Brussels European Council Conclusions (16 
September 2010), para. 2. 
7
 EU Declaration on Globalisation, annexed to Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 
December 14, 2007, p. 25.   
8
 Opinion of the European Commission, pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
Conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States convened to revise the 
Treaties, July 13, 2007, Council 11625/07 POLGEN 83, p. 8. 
9
 Le Figaro, 18 August 2008.  
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It is against this background that this Chapter focuses on the main changes introduced 
at Lisbon in relation to the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is structured as follows. First, 
it examines the structural changes introduced at Lisbon, and assesses them in the 
light of their declared objectives as well as the broader constitutional context set out 
by the Treaties. Second, it analyses the institutional innovations,  with special 
emphasis on the High Representative, and the European External Action Service. 
Third, it focuses on CSDP, an area of increasing topicality on which the Lisbon 
Treaty puts considerable emphasis.  
 
Structural changes   
 
There are two main changes in the structure of the system of EU foreign affairs, 
namely the abolition of the pillar structure, and the re-organisation of all the external 
policies of the Union within a unitary system of principles and objectives. 
 
The pillar structure of the Union has been a constant since the Maastricht Treaty. It 
divided the activities of the Union in three distinct sets of rules, the European 
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the latter succeeding the Justice and Home Affairs 
framework originally established at Maastricht). The logic of the pillar structure was 
simple: the Member States want to cooperate in a wide range of areas (economic, 
political, social, criminal), albeit at a differing pace, following different models of 
integration, decision-making and judicial control, all depending on the political 
sensitivity of the subject-matter in question. Viewed from this angle, the pillar-
 5 
structure conveyed this reality clearly: CFSP, for instance, was deemed so central to 
the core of the sovereignty of the Member States that the legal framework set out in 
the old second pillar (ex Title V TEU) was organised on the basis of predominantly 
intergovernmental features: decision-making was mainly by unanimity, the CFSP 
measures were distinct from those adopted pursuant to the traditional Community 
method, the Court of Justice was expressly excluded from exercising its jurisdiction 
over such measures, the Commission did not have the exclusive right of legislative 
initiative, and the role of the Parliament was peripheral at most.  
 
However, the coexistence of different sets of rules made the Union legal system 
complex and, to outside observers, puzzling. This was exacerbated by the existence of 
legal linkages between them. The Union was based on a single institutional 
framework,10 and the Council and the Commission were responsible for ensuring the 
consistency between the various external policies, irrespective of the legal framework 
within which they were carried out.11 Therefore, whilst governed by distinct sets of 
rules which differed considerably in their legal effects, the pillars were viewed as part 
of a functional whole, the life of which depended on the interactions between a single 
set of institutions, which would exercise different powers depending on whether they 
acted under the first or the second pillar.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty dealt with the complexities raised by the co-existence of distinct, 
albeit interacting, legal frameworks by abolishing the pillars altogether. This change, 
otherwise known as 'depillarization',12 led to the integration of the Common Foreign 
                                                 
10




 See Editorial, ‘The CFSP under the EU Constitutional Treaty – Issues of Depillarization’, (2005) 42 
CMLRev 325. 
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and Security Policy, as well as the Judicial and Police Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters, in a unitary framework, the EU one, hence rendering the EC a thing of the 
past.  
 
However, to what extent has the formal abolition of the pillars given rise to a truly 
integrated legal order? Has it established a framework where foreign policy is carried 
out on the basis of similar rules as the other Union's external policies? Or has it 
merely abolished the appearance of separate sets of rules, whilst in reality maintaining 
the distinct characteristics of CFSP?  
 
As far as the old third pillar is concerned, there is no doubt that it has been fully 
integrated within the Union legal order, hence its distinct pillar structure abolished 
both formally and substantively.13 The CFSP framework, however, maintains its very 
distinct legal character which differentiates it from all other EU external policies. The 
structure and wording of the Treaty on the European Union leaves no doubt about 
this. Firstly, the substantive provisions of CFSP are still set out in a separate 
instrument, the Treaty on European Union, whilst all the other EU policies are set out 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Secondly, Article 
2(4) TFEU refers to the Union’s competence in the area of CFSP as a category 
distinct from all the other categories of competence.14 Furthermore, Article 24(1) 
TEU states that the ‘common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules 
and procedures’.  
                                                 
13
 See Memoranda by M. Fletcher and V. Mitsilegas, House of Lords European Union Committee, 10th 
Report of Session 2007-08, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment – Vol II: Evidence, E149 and 
E166 respectively. 
14
 These include exclusive (Art. 2(1) and 3 TFEU), shared, (Art. 2(2) and 4 TEU), coordinating 
competence (2(3) and 5 TEU), and competence to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States (Art. 2(5) and 6 TEU). See  R. Schütze, 'Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: 
A Prospective Analysis', (2008) 33 ELRev 709. 
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This clear sense of distinctiveness, albeit within a unitary structure, is reinforced by 
the provision of Article 40 TEU. This illustrates clearly the distinct nature of CFSP 
within the EU constitutional architecture, and is worth citing in full: 
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 
3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect 
the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.  
 
The above provision builds upon the Nice arrangements which provided that 'nothing 
[in the second and third pillar] shall affect the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing 
them'.15 However, it goes considerably further: whilst the previous constitutional 
arrangements protected the unique character of the Community legal order from any 
intrusion from intergovernmental forms of cooperation, the Lisbon amendment in 
Article 40 TEU protects the unique character of CFSP too. Therefore, rather than 
integrating it seamlessly into the overall Union constitutional structure, the new 
provision underlines the distinct legal nature of the CFSP set of rules and renders its 
preservation a matter of constitutional significance.  
  
                                                 
15
 ex Art. 47 TEU.  
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The distinct nature of CFSP is also maintained in the way in which its conduct is 
governed by the Lisbon arrangements. First, in terms of decision-making, the 
prevailing role of unanimity is maintained,16 whilst any derogations from this 
requirement are limited and clearly prescribed, as was the case under the Nice Treaty. 
In accordance with Article 31(2) TEU, derogations from the principle of unanimity 
are provided in cases where: 
 - the Council adopts a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a 
previous decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests 
and objectives, 
 - where the Council adopts a decision implementing a previous decision defining a 
Union action or position,  
 - where the Council adopts a decision appointing a special representative.  
 
It becomes apparent that the above derogations are of limited significance in so far as 
their exercise depends on the prior adoption of a CFSP measure by unanimity. To the 
above list, the Lisbon Treaty adds two further derogations: the first applies to the 
adoption of any decision defining a Union action or position on a proposal which the 
High Representative has presented following a specific request from the European 
Council, the latter made either on its own initiative or that of the High Representative; 
the second is in cases where the European Council decides unanimously that the 
Council may act by a qualified majority.17 Both are entirely consistent with the logic 
of the exceptions introduced by the previous constitutional arrangements and 
maintained at Lisbon, hence further confirming the dominant role of unanimity in the 
area of foreign and security policy. In any case, the Lisbon Treaty maintains the 
                                                 
16
 Art. 31(1) TEU. 
17
 Art. 31(3) TEU. 
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'emergency break' provided under Nice, which enables Member States to oppose the 
adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority 'for vital and stated reasons of 
national policy'.18 Finally, the derogations are not applicable to decisions with military 
or defence implications.19 
  
Second, CFSP is still excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Article 
24(1) TEU which sets out this provision refers to two exceptions: firstly, the 
monitoring of compliance with Article 40 TEU, and secondly, the review of legality 
of CFSP decisions adopted by the Council and providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons.20 However, in effect, neither of the above provisions 
introduce an exception to the exclusion of CFSP from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. The former has always been considered to fall within the purview of the Court 
which has produced, over the years, a number of important judgments on the dividing 
line between the CFSP (and the old third pillar) and the (old) Community legal 
framework.21 As for the latter, it is significant, and follows the logic of the jurisdiction 
which the Court has already exercised in the area of economic sanctions targeting 
individuals in cases where these are adopted in accordance with prior CFSP 
measures.22  
  
                                                 
18
 Art. 31(2) second subpara. TEU which provides that the High Representative will search for a 
solution acceptable to the State in question, failing which the Council may decide by a qualified 
majority to refer the matter to the European Council for decision by unanimity. 
19
 Art. 31(4) TEU.  
20
 This is set out in Art. 275(2) TFEU to which Art. 24(1) TEU refers.  
21
 See Case C-417/96 Commission v. Council (re: Airport Transit Visas) [1998] ECR I-2763, Case C-
176/03 Commission v. Council (re: criminal law and environmental protection) [2005] ECR I-7879, 
Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v. Council (re: Passenger Name Record  Agreement) 
[2006] I-4721, Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council (criminal environmental sanctions) [2007] ECR 
I-9097, Case C-403/05 Parliament v. Commission (re: border support to Philippines) [2007] ECR I-
9045, Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (re: small arms and light weapons) [2006] ECR I-1145. 
22
 This was the case under ex Art. 301 EC, and now under Art. 215 TFEU. See, for instance the long 
line of cases about smart sanctions, such as the much discussed Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05 
P Kadi and Al-Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351.   
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Third, in relation to instruments available to the Union to carry out its foreign and 
security policy, the Lisbon Treaty appears to change things. It is recalled that, under 
the previous arrangements, the instruments used in the (old) Community legal order 
(regulations, directives, decisions) were not available in the second pillar. Instead, 
CFSP-specific measures were provided, mainly joint actions, common positions, and 
common strategies. The Lisbon Treaty replaced these special instruments with 
'decisions'.23 However, these measures are set out to do precisely what their 
precursors were doing: a decision may define an action to be undertaken by the 
Union,24 a position to be taken, or the approach of the Union to a particular matter of 
a geographical or thematic nature,25 functions assumed by joint actions, common 
positions and common strategies respectively under the previous constitutional 
dispensation.  Furthermore, Article 24(1) TEU rules out expressly the adoption of 
legislative acts.  
 
The above brief overview suggests that the Lisbon Treaty abolishes the pillar 
structure only in name. Indeed, it transposes the previous set of rules in a unitary 
structure, with all its legal characteristics intact. This is explained by the logic of the 
pillar structure which still permeates the Union constitutional order as set out at 
Lisbon: whilst Member States are determined to broaden the scope of their 
cooperation in areas deemed to be closer to the functions traditionally carried out by 
States, and whilst they deem it sensible to rely upon institutions and processes of 
what used to be the Community legal order, they wish to do so at a different pace, in 
accordance with a different model of integration, and in order to achieve qualitatively 
different objectives. It was this fundamental differentiation that the establishment of 
                                                 
23
 Art. 25 TEU.  
24
 Art. 28(1) TEU. 
25
 Art. 29 TEU. 
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the complex pillar structure sought to convey, and the abolition of the appearance of 
that structure by no means makes it any less valid or present. Similarly, whilst the 
previous pillar-structure was viewed as complex, the removal of the appearance of 
complexity does not necessarily make the new legal structure any easier to manage.  
 
The second structural change introduced at Lisbon is the reorganisation of all the EU 
external policies, including the CFSP, under a common set of values, principles and 
objectives. These policies include the Common Commercial Policy (CCP),26 
development cooperation,27 economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries,28 humanitarian aid,29 sanctions,30 CFSP,31 and CSDP.32 Whilst they were 
set out in different parts of primary law, each carried out in order to pursue its 
specific objectives, the Lisbon Treaty brings them together, and lays down a set of 
common principles and objectives which all these policies should pursue, irrespective 
of their specific legal characteristics.  
 
The principles are set out in Article 21(1) TEU and include, rather predictably, 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law. The objectives are set out in Article 21(2) TEU and are noteworthy 
for both their range and ambition:  
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
                                                 
26
 Arts 206–7 TFEU. 
27
 Arts 208–11 TFEU. 
28
 Arts 212–13 TFEU. 
29
 Art. 214 TFEU. 
30
 Art. 215 TFEU. 
31
 Arts 23–41 TEU. 
32
 Arts 42–6 TEU. 
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(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, 
including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to 
ensure sustainable development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made 
disasters; and 
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and 
good global governance. 
 
These principles guide not only the conduct of the Union's external policies, but also 
the external aspects of the Union's other policies.33 Finally, Article 21(3) TEU spells 
out the requirement of consistency between the different external policies, and 
between these and the Union's other policies, compliance with which it entrusts to the 
Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.  
 
                                                 
33
 Art. 21(3) TEU.  
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Whilst the ‘depillarization’ of the Union seeks to signify the formal integration of its 
foreign affairs system, the above provisions aim to bring about its substantive 
integration. To that effect, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the term 'external action', 
rather than 'external relations' or 'policies',  which covers all external economic, 
political and security strands. This term, and the singular in which it is couched, 
signifies the design, and therefore conduct, of the Union's foreign affairs as a 
coherent whole. As it relates to all the different facets of the Union's international 
posture, it reflects their singular focus. This is yet another indication that, in the 
process of European integration and the drafting of the relevant primary rules, 
semantics matter. 
 
Institutional changes  
 
The Lisbon Treaty has a visible impact on the institutional machinery of the Union in 
the area of foreign affairs by establishing the post of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs ad Security Policy, and assigning to it a new service, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS).  
 
The aim of this innovation is to provide the Union's foreign affairs with a face. By 
providing an answer to the perennial question which Henry Kissinger is purported to 
have raised, this new post is also intended to facilitate the coherence of external 
policies and provide a single point of contact. Under the Constitutional Treaty, the 
post holder would have had a different title, namely Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
However, this proved to be controversial, as it was a title associated with States. 
Therefore, following the negative referenda in The Netherlands and France in 2005, 
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and the scaling down of the express constitutional ambitions of the Treaty 
amendments,34 the Member States opted for the current, rather innocuous, title.  
 
The High Representative is responsible for the conduct of the CFSP. In order to 
ensure the coherence of that policy, it was decided that the holder of the post should 
have two institutional affiliations: on the one hand, she is a Vice President of the 
Commission and, on the other hand, she chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. This dual 
institutional configuration links this new post with both the supranational and 
intergovernmental facets of the Union's institutional structure, and is, therefore, 
intended to ensure the coherence and consistency of the EU's international action. 
There is some merit in this thought. The Commission and the Council represent 
different interests which often clash: as the Commission is the guardian of the Treaty, 
and the Council the forum where Member States represent and protect their own 
interests, they waste too much time and energy in legal and policy disputes. The 
establishment of a post which would straddle these institutions may justifiably give 
rise to hope that it would reduce the scope for such disputes, and perhaps make their 
conflicting interests meet. 
 
However, a closer look reveals a more nuanced picture. Three observations are worth 
making. First, the Treaty is strikingly vague about the role of the High Representative. 
Whilst it is stated that she is responsible for the conduct of CFSP,35 and for 
representing the Union for matters relating to this policy,36 Article 18(4) TEU 
provides that she 'shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities 
                                                 
34
 See the mandate for the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference (Council Doc. 11218/07, Brussels 26 
July 2007, para. 1). 
35
 Art. 18(2) TEU. 
36
 Art. 27(2) TEU.  
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incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's 
external action'. This is silent on which specific areas of EU foreign affairs are under 
her supervision, and provides no guidance as to how she is to interact with other EU 
institutions and bodies. Therefore, the Union's primary law sets a blank canvas on 
which the first High Representative is to write her job description. In doing so, she 
cannot act on her own. After all, her role is shaped by the other EU actors with whom 
she interacts, namely the Member States (which appoint her), the Commission (of 
which she is a Vice President), the President of the Commission (who decides for the 
allocation of portfolios), and the President of the European Council. It is rather 
curious that the post of High Representative, which purported to bring clarity and 
coherence in the EU's foreign affairs, should be defined in such unclear terms.  
 
Second, the ‘double-hatting’ of the High Representative may prove to be deeply 
problematic on grounds of both institutional loyalty and substantive efficiency. For 
instance, Article 218(3) TFEU provides that the High Representative, rather than the 
Commission, would recommend that the Council authorise the opening of 
negotiations of international agreements in areas where the subject-matter of the 
agreements relates exclusively or principally to the CFSP. Whilst in principle a 
positive proposition, in practice it is precisely the question of the delimitation between 
the CFSP and other external policies which has given rise to very considerable 
interinstitutional disputes.37 This new provision of the Lisbon Treaty by no means 
makes it easier to determine whether an agreement is principally about CFSP, or 
whether it is about other aspects of the Union's external action with merely CFSP 
implications, an issue in relation to which the case-law of the Court has been 
                                                 
37
 See Case C-403/05 Parliament v. Commission (re: border support to Philippines) [2007] ECR I-
9045, Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (re: small arms and light weapons) [2006] ECR I-1145. 
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distinctly unhelpful.38 As for the internal dynamics which shape the post and its 
function, the experience of the appointment of the first High Representative, Baroness 
Ashton, is indicative of the ample scope for the relevant actors to hone their skills in 
horse-trading, as it involved intense haggling between EU institutions (the European 
Parliament included), and Member States. Furthermore, it did not go unnoticed that 
the President of the Commission, Manuel Baroso, did not give the European 
Neighbourhood Policy to Baroness Ashton, but to the Commissioner responsible for 
enlargement; and political circles in Brussels thought it interesting that Baroness 
Ashton appointed most of her staff from her previous Commission cabinet, and that 
she chose to be based in the Commission building.  
 
Third, whilst the appointment of the High Representative was intended to bring clarity 
to the Union's international posture and coherence in the conduct of its external 
action, in practice she is not the only player active in the area of foreign affairs. She 
coexists with the President of the European Council who, according to Article 15(6) 
TEU, ‘shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the 
Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice 
to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’. Furthermore, the Treaty also assigns a role to the President of the 
Commission, as the latter, ‘[w]ith the exception of the common foreign and security 
policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union's 
                                                 
38
 See P. Koutrakos, 'The nexus between development and CSDP' in A. Arnull, C. Barnard, M. 
Dougan, and E. Spaventa, (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in EU Law in Honour of 
Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 589. For an analysis of the relevant case-law, see A. 
Dashwood, 'Article 47 TEU and the relationship between first and second pillar competences' in A. 
Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 70, J. Heliskoski, 'Small arms and light weapons within the Union’s 
pillar structure: an analysis of Article 47 TEU’, (2008) 33 ELRev 898, C. Hillion and R. Wessel, 
'Competence distribution in EU external relations after ECOWAS: clarification or continued 
fuzziness?’, (2009) 46 CMLRev 551. 
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external representation’.39 In addition, the rotating Presidency still chairs all Council 
meetings, except for the Foreign Affairs one, and is therefore involved in the external 
aspects of all other Union policies. Therefore, the international representation of the 
Union is still not the responsibility of just one actor, and the determination of who 
speaks for the Union would depend, again, on the interaction between various actors 
and their ability and willingness to delineate their role.  
 
It follows from the above brief overview that the Lisbon Treaty does not define a 
legal system which would ensure the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external 
action, increase clarity and raise its visibility. Instead, it sets out a broad and flexible 
framework which may allow the various institutional actors to act in a way that may 
enhance effectiveness and coherence. This, and the scope for compromise, political 
disagreements, and inter-institutional skirmishes which it entails, are illustrated 
clearly by the process of establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 
The setting up of this body is considered 'one of the most significant changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon'.40 Aiming to assist the High Representative by 
working in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States, the EEAS 
consists of Commission and Council officials, as well as diplomats seconded from the 
Member States.41 The introduction of the EEAS was not uncontroversial – in the UK, 
for instance, the then Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague (now 
Foreign Secretary) saw it as yet another illustration of ‘a power grab by the EU’.42 
And yet, the idea of the EEAS is sensible, as it is intended to provide a focal point for 
                                                 
39
 Art. 17(1) TEU.  
40
 Council Conclusions of 26 April 2010 (8967/10), p 8. 
41
 Art. 27(3) TEU.  
42
 The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 2008. 
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the EU as an international actor, to make coordination easier, and to foster a culture of 
cooperation between officials from Member States and the EU institutions.  
 
However, not for the first time, the Lisbon Treaty is silent on the specifics about the 
Service's function: the distribution of posts amongst the Council, the Commission and 
the Member States, the scope of the policies it shall oversee, the definition of the lines 
of authority between the Union institutions involved, its precise function in the 
conduct of the Union's foreign affairs, are all left open. Against this blank canvas, the 
organisation and management of the EEAS provided the playground for the kind of 
inter-institutional disputes which its establishment had purported to address.  
 
In particular, two controversial issues arose. The first was about development 
cooperation and the various financing instruments which it covers, such as the 
Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund: should it 
be integrated in the tasks entrusted to the EEAS, or should it become a distinct and 
autonomous policy within the Union's external action? The Commission was hostile 
to the former, as it felt that it would undermine its powers as set out in Article 17(1) 
TEU: these include the Union's external representation, with the exception of the 
common foreign and security policy, the execution of the budget and the management 
of programmes, and the exercise of coordinating, executive and management 
functions as laid down in primary law. These are sensitive matters: their resolution 
touches upon issues of efficiency and effectiveness, practical considerations (the 
development budget is very considerable), as well as institutional powers deeply 
entrenched through successive rounds of Treaty amendments. The proposal made by 
the High Representative in March 2010 suggested the integration of development 
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policy in the functions of the EEAS, and turned out to be controversial. Most non-
governmental organisations viewed it as a Trojan horse which would undermine both 
the integrity of development policy and the powers of the Commission.43 The 
Parliament, on the other hand, was keen not only to avoid the contamination of the 
Community (now Union) method which governs development cooperation by the 
intergovernmental features of the EEAS, but was also keen to increase its leverage in 
the conduct of the EU's external action by intervening directly on the funding of the 
Service, and the appointment of Heads of Delegation.  
 
The input of the Parliament turned out to be the second controversial issue as, in 
addition to the above, the only directly elected Union institution was keen to underline 
the political accountability of EEAS and ensure that the latter would not be diluted by 
the management structure of the Service. One of the issues about which it felt strongly 
was to ensure that the person deputising for the High Representative before the 
Parliament would be politically accountable, and not an official. In order to appreciate 
its role in the establishment of the EEAS, it is recalled that, whilst required only to be 
consulted on the establishment of the Service,44 the Parliament is to give its consent to 
the amendments of the Staff and Financial Regulations which are necessary for the 
EEAS to become operational. Therefore, not for the first time following the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament saw it fit to flex its muscle.45 
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Following intense inter-institutional haggling, the final outcome, set out in Decision 
2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of EEAS,46 followed the 
logic of integrating development in the EEAS functions. However, it does so by 
seeking to square the circle and engaging in a very delicate balancing exercise. The 
High Representative is responsible for the coordination between all the EU financial 
instruments, but the management of these programmes remains under the 
responsibility of the Commission,47 and the EEAS shall 'contribute to the 
programming and management cycle' of these instruments, and shall be responsible 
for 'preparing Commission decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the 
programming cycle'.48 All proposals are to be prepared following Commission 
procedures, and the role of the Commissioner responsible for development is 
pronounced; for instance, in relation to the European Development Fund and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument in particular, that is the programmes involving 
the majority of the development policy budget, both the EEAS and the Commission 
are to make any proposals under the supervision of the Development Commissioner.49 
Furthermore, the High Representative adopted a Declaration on political 
accountability in which she sets out the practicalities of her interactions with the 
Parliament.50 These include an exchange of views for newly appointed Heads of 
Delegations to countries and organisations which the Parliament considers 
strategically important (whilst the latter had argued originally, and rather bizarrely, 
for all Heads of Delegations). It also provides for the person who would deputise the 
High Representative before the Parliament, namely a Commissioner or a minister 
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from the rotating Presidency (or the trio Presidencies) depending on the subject matter 
of discussion. 
 
Whether the compromise outlined above is workable remains to be seen.51 For the 
purpose of this analysis, suffice it to point out its vague language, the complex 
arrangements it sets out, and its underlying effort to strike the balance between 
competing claims to influence by interacting Union institutions. Whilst 
understandable for practical reasons and political expediency, this compromise cannot 
hide the fact that its success in practice depends on too many variables: the 
willingness of the Union institutions to take a leap of faith and cooperate in order to 
make the policies in which the EEAS participates truly coherent: the personality of 
the relevant post holders and their ability to navigate their way through the 
compromises enshrined in Decision 2010/427/EU and the vague language in which 
these are couched. Another consideration to be taken into account is the response of 
diplomats of Member States. Both Article 27(3) TEU and the Decision refer to the 
cooperation of the EEAS with the diplomatic services of the Member States. How 
easy will it be for the missions of the big Member States to share information, given 
that their foreign policy stature depends on it, and that the Lisbon provisions on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy enables them to retain their foreign policy role?  
All in all, one need not be a cynic to have serious doubts as to whether this system is 
workable, given the energy and time wasted by the Union institutions in turf wars 
about the legal basis of external measures in other areas.52  
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The brief overview in this section suggests that the institutional innovations 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of foreign affairs by no means provide a 
definitive answer to the Union's problems in foreign affairs, neither do they change 
fundamentally the factors which have been shown to slow down the Union's ability to 
act. Instead, they set out a new framework within which all the different interests and 
factors which shape the Union's foreign affairs are rearranged. It is a new terrain 
which enables the Union's actors to reconstitute their role in a way which, depending 
on a range of variables, might enhance the Union's ability to act as a credible 
international partner.  
 
Common Security and Defence Policy  
 
Since December 1998, when President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair met at St 
Malo, the development of the security and defence policy has gained considerable 
momentum. The Union has carried out a significant number of missions around the 
world, ranging from border control missions (in Georgia and Palestine), to military 
missions (for instance in Chad) to police missions (for instance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) to rule of law missions (for instance in Iraq), to maritime missions (in 
Somalia).53 
 
The Lisbon Treaty pays considerable attention to the area of security and defence. 
This becomes apparent not only from the substance of the relevant TEU  provisions, 
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but also their general scheme, as well as the very title of the policy. While, under the 
previous constitutional arrangements, it was entitled 'European Security and Defence 
Policy’, it has now become 'Common Security and Defence Policy'. Furthermore, the 
TEU provisions on security and defence are grouped together under a distinct section 
within Title V TEU (the latter setting out the general provisions of the Union's 
external action and specific provisions on the CFSP). Finally, Article 42(1) TEU 
states that the CSDP 'shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security 
policy'.  
 
In terms of substantive content, the Lisbon Treaty expands the range of activities 
which fall within the scope of CSDP, albeit merely formalising existing practice.54 In 
the light of the limited length of this chapter, the following analysis focuses on three 
specific issues, namely military capabilities, flexibility, and the mutual assistance 




The ambition of the Union to play an important security role in the world, and the 
range of missions it has carried out has brought to the fore the issue of military 
capabilities. Following the end of the Cold War, the European defence industries have 
been facing very serious problems (including underfunding, shortages in certain areas 
and oversupply in others, insufficient funding of research and development), and the 
financial crisis  has imposed further constraints on national defence budgets. The 
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perilous state of the defence capabilities in Europe was highlighted with brutal 
honesty in a widely discussed speech by the then outgoing United States Defence 
Secretary Gate on the future of NATO in which he referred to 'the very real possibility 
of collective military irrelevance'.55 
 
The emphasis which the Lisbon Treaty places on this aspect of security policy is 
illustrated in two ways. First, it imposes a duty on Member States to 'make civilian 
and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common 
security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council'.56 
Second, it provides for a special intergovernmental body, namely the European 
Defence Agency (EDA) which is intended to be active in the area of defence 
capabilities development, research, acquisition, and armaments.57  
 
Both developments are actually less spectacular in their implications than they might 
appear at first sight. On the one hand, whilst suggesting a degree of impetus in this 
area, the duty imposed on Member States is vague in its scope, and silent in its 
implications. Most importantly, it needs to be considered in the light of the numerous 
reminders in the Treaty and its attached Declarations that the Member States are the 
locus for the organisation of their defence.58  Viewed from this angle, the provision of 
Article 42(3) TEU is more interesting at the level of semantics, rather than substance.  
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As for the EDA, its story provides a useful reminder of the limits of legal rules. In 
fact, it was established in 2004, that is well before the Lisbon Treaty was even 
drafted, and even before it became clear that the Constitutional Treaty was dead.59 
Furthermore, whilst the work that the Agency has been doing is largely positive, 
sensible and well-received, it is also limited in its scope, and has been marred by 
disagreements between Member States as to its approach (whether it should focus on 
developing synergies in order to deal with short term issues, or long term projects), 
and budget.  
 
It is noteworthy that, in the area of defence industries more generally, the more 
important developments originate beyond the Lisbon Treaty altogether. After a series 
of initiatives assessing the serious economic problems facing the European defence 
industries,60 and advocating the adoption of a wide range of measures,61 the 
Commission put forward its so-called 'defence package' in December 2007, following 
which two specific measures have been adopted by the Council, namely Directive 
2009/43 on intra-EU transfers of defence products,62 and Directive 2009/81 on public 
procurement in the fields of defence and security.63 These aim to bring the benefits of 
the internal market to this sensitive area whilst acknowledging that the relevant 
products have special characteristics which may not be addressed by EU secondary 
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legislation governing the movement and procurement of other, non-strategic goods. 
Another related development is about the only primary law provision which refers to 
the defence industries and which has long been interpreted by the Member States as a 
carte blanche to exclude them from the application of Union law, namely Article 346 
TFEU.64 Ending years of abuse and confusion as to its proper interpretation, the 
Commission suggested, in December 2006, that Article 346 TFEU (ex Article 296 
EC) should be interpreted strictly and made it clear that any abusive practice by the 
Member States would be brought before the Court of Justice.65 
 
It becomes thus clear that, whilst indicative of the focus of the momentum that the 
CSDP has gathered over the recent years and the focus of the EU on its further 
development, the Lisbon provisions on military capabilities may play only a very 
limited role in progress on the ground in that area. Given the nature of security and 
defence at the very core of national sovereignty, the acknowledgment of the role of 
the States as fully responsible for their defence as well as prioritising their defence 
spending and availability of resources, the financial crisis and the ensuing cuts in the 
defence budgets of the EU military powers and the distinctly intergovernmental 
character of cooperation set out in primary law, it is hardly surprising that the role of 
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The second interesting innovation introduced at Lisbon is the formalisation of 
flexibility. In other words, it sanctions formal arrangements which would enable 
groups of Member States to act together on their own. These may take different 
forms. On the one hand, the Treaty introduces a 'willing and able' clause: the Union 
may entrust the execution of a task to a group of countries which are willing and have 
the necessary capabilities 'in order to protect the Union's values and serve its 
interests'.66 This would be done in accordance with the standard voting requirement, 
namely unanimity,67 and following a proposal by the High Representative or an 
initiative by a Member State. There are two substantive conditions which need to be 
met cumulatively: the first is subjective, and requires that the Member States involved 
be willing to implement the task in question; the second condition is objective, and 
requires that the Member States involved have the necessary capability for such a 
task. It is for the participating Member States to agree among themselves about the 
management of the task entrusted to them, albeit in association with the High 
Representative, whilst keeping the Council regularly informed.68  
 
On the other hand, the Treaty provides for  'permanent structured cooperation': this is 
about groups of Member States which meet certain criteria and have made certain 
commitments on military capabilities.69 These commitments are set out in a Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty, and are about coordinating investment expenditure on defence 
equipment, encouraging cooperation in the training and logistics, enhancing the 
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availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, and 
participating in joint equipment programmes in the framework of the EDA.70 
 
It is entirely proper that flexibility mechanisms should be viewed as a necessary 
component of an effective security and defence policy. In an entity as diverse in 
membership and defence capacity as the European Union is, flexibility would enhance 
its ability to assert its identity on the international scene. What is noteworthy in the 
mechanisms set out in the Lisbon Treaty, which originated in the Constitutional 
Treaty, is the increasing tendency in the EU towards not only an expansion of the 
scope of flexibility, but mainly its formalisation. This is an important point because, 
as a matter of fact, there is a considerable degree of flexibility in how the Union 
carries out its defence policy anyway. For instance, not all Member States participate 
in all CSDP missions, and, in any case, Member States have already pooled resources 
together and organised joint units (such as the battle groups).71  The other factor 
which needs to be taken into account when assessing the CSDP flexibility provisions 
is their vague wording. Much as the commitment to cooperation and coordination 
between the participating States is commendable, the requirements set out in the 
Treaty itself as well as the accompanying Protocol are couched in such broad terms 
that there are hardly any solid criteria to assess compliance – once again, it is for the 
Member States to determine what to make of them. In this respect, there has been 
some discussion amongst Member States during the Belgian Presidency in the latter 
part of 2010, and a German-Swedish proposal for closer military cooperation.72 
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However, all these developments have been brought up by Member States, rather than 
the Union institutions, and are more geared towards the rationalisation of military 
cooperation.  
 
The mutual assistance clause  
 
For the first time in the Union's constitutional history, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a 
mutual assistance clause. This is laid down in Article 42(7) TEU, and refers to cases 
where a Member State is the victim from armed aggression on its territory. In this 
case, the other Member States 'shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter'.  
 
This clause imposes a duty on Member States, the scope of which appears to be very 
broad: 'by all the means in their power'. The caveats which are set out are broad too, 
as they relate to compliance with international law,73 the neutrality of certain Member 
States, and the fundamental choices about security and defence made by Member 
States in relation to NATO. This formulation of the mutual assistance clause is 
entirely consistent with the tenor of CSDP, and the balance which it seeks to strike 
between the security and defence choices made by the Member States and the 
common policy which it envisages for the Union. 
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However, the question which Article 42(7) TEU raises is how far are Member States 
required to go in order to comply with their duty of solidarity, and how rigorous can 
the enforcement of this duty be. Its wording suggests that military means constitute 
merely one option open to a Member State when it examines how best to comply with 
its duty. It also suggests that compliance with the mutual assistance clause cannot but 
depend on the subjective assessment of a Member State as to how best it may assist 
another Member State which is a victim of armed aggression on its territory. This 
assessment is subject to multifarious considerations, not least of a political and 
economic nature. Such inherently indeterminate criteria do not lend themselves to a 
rigorous mechanism of verification or control. There can be no agreed assessment 
mechanism as to whether, for instance, military means should be relied upon by all 
Member States. After all, the EU is not a military alliance, and the mutual assistance 
clause does not render it one.74  
 
The above does not mean to suggest that the provision of Article 42(7) TUE is not 
significant. On the one hand, it is a specific illustration of political solidarity, one of 
the main pillars of CFSP as laid down in Article 24(3) TEU. As such, it may appear to 
merely state the obvious. However, when it comes to the Union's foreign policy, the 
obvious often needs to be stated. It is recalled that, when Greece claimed that its 
territorial integrity was undermined by Turkey in the Imia incident in December 1995, 
and Spain made a similar claim regarding Morocco in the Leila incident in July 2002, 
their fellow Member States failed woefully to provide any substantial support in terms 
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of political solidarity, let alone even assurances about military assistance.75 It is 
against this background that the mutual assistance clause must be understood. On the 
other hand, the interpretation of the mutual assistance clause is subject to continuous 
redefinition: the development of CSDP and political solidarity in general, and of 
common structures of military capabilities in particular, is bound to have an impact on 
how close to the military end of the scale Member States would be prepared to go in 
order to assist a Member State under attack.    
 
There is another function of the mutual assistance clause which is noteworthy: against 
the various CSDP missions which are carried out in far-flung places and export EU 
values to third parties, it renders the CSDP relevant to the Union's citizens in a much 
more direct manner. In other words, it bolsters a sense of belonging by reaffirming the 
solidarity between Member States. However, its practical significance should a crisis 




Compared to the raving statements of the various Union actors, this Chapter paints a 
more nuanced picture of the main innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the 
area of CFSP. Rather than providing the answers to the Union's questions about a 
more effective and coherent foreign policy, the new Treaty shapes a new negotiating 
environment within which the political will of the Member States may decide how to 
use the new toolkit it provides. The inter-institutional skirmishes which have 
characterised the Union's international action will by no means become a thing of the 
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past, and the practical problems which have hampered the development of a truly 
effective security policy will not simply evaporate. As all these form part and parcel 
of the Union's deeply idiosyncratic constitutional set up, they will continue to affect 
the conduct of foreign affairs, albeit in the revamped framework set out by the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
In effect, this analysis of the Lisbon Treaty illustrates the limits of primary legal rules. 
Another way of making this point is to notice what the Treaty fails to mention. In the 
area of external economic relations, for instance, there is no reference to the duty of 
cooperation. This has been developed by the Court of Justice over the years as 
binding both the EU institutions and the Member States in the process of negotiation, 
conclusion and application of mixed agreements.76 As it refers to areas where the EU 
shares competence with its Member States, this duty is central to the conduct of EU 
external action. It has become a central constitutional principle which governs the 
complex and multilayered system of EU external relations. And yet, the Lisbon Treaty 
which purports to streamline and organise this system fails to mention it in this 
context. However, this will by no means render the principle any less important, 
neither will it prevent the Court from developing further its interpretation. 
 
Finally, in policy terms, it is the substantive initiatives undertaken by the EU 
institutions and the Member States which determine the effectiveness of the Union’s 
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international action, as well as other multifarious factors, such as political 
developments in the Member States, the international geopolitical context and the 
economic environment. Furthermore, one should not forget that the international role 
of the EU is intrinsically linked to its internal policies. This link becomes more 
significant in the current economic and political climate in which Member States are 
prepared to flex their protectionist reflexes, the stability of the Euro is seriously 
challenged, and the European leaders have failed to tackle the crisis with imagination 
and decisiveness. It is worth recalling that the starting point for the Union's 
international role is its success as a major economic player and a laboratory for 
innovative transnational economic governance. The existential crisis which the Union 
has been suffering in the light of the fundamental problems of its eurozone is bound to 
affect the Union's international posture, hence creating policy problems which the 
legal rules of the Lisbon Treaty would be inherently unsuitable to address. 
 
